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Date: January 15, 2007. 
Note: The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and 
submitted to the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE).   2 
Present value 
In the calculations of the present value of the future consumer surplus from the given product 




























Transforming  12 , , , , F r a p p  
The expected payoff of trying the new brand in the market,  12 , , , , F r a p p , is the expected 
net value of trying the new brand,  2 2 1 1 2 2 / 1 1 / v a p v p r v a p r r , 
minus the net value of continuing to purchase the incumbent brand,  11 1/ v p r r . 
12 , , , , F r a p p  can also be expressed as the value of buying a high quality new brand 
instead of the incumbent brand, from this period on multiplied by the probability that the new 
brand is of high quality 2 2 1 1 1 1 / v a p v p r r , minus the value of buying the 
incumbent brand instead of the new brand if the new brand is of low 
quality 1 1 2 2 /(1 ) v p v a p r , multiplied by the probability that the new brand is of 
low quality,  . 
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Differentiating 12 , , , , F r a p p  with respect to its elements 
We differentiate 12 , , , , F r a p p  with respect to its elements 1 , , , r a p , and  2 p . 
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p . 
Conditions that give an optimal bid that equals the expected consumption value in an 
auction for a new experience good 
It is straightforward to show that if 1 1 2 2 v p v a p ,  1 1 2 2 v p v a p , r ,  0, 
1, or  0 a , there would not be any information value associated with trying the new 
brand in the auction, and the subgame perfect bidding strategy would be equal to the expected 
consumption value. 
First, if  1 1 2 2 v p v a p , we have that F0 . This gives the following optimal bid from 
equation (14):   4 
(A8)  22 21 Bid v a v a . 
Second, if  1 1 2 2 v p v a p , we have thatF0 . This gives the following optimal bid 
from equation (15): 
(A9)  22 21 Bid v a v a .   
Third, when r approaches  , we have that limF
r  can be both positive and negative. This 
gives the following optimal bid from equations (14) and (15): 
(A10)  22 lim 2 1
r Bid v a v a . 
Fourth, if 0, we have thatF0 . This gives the following optimal bid from equation 
(14): 
(A11)  2 2 2 21 Bid v a v a v a . 
Fifth, if 1, we have thatF0 . This gives the following optimal bid from equation (15): 
(A12)  2 2 2 21 Bid v a v a v a . 
Sixth, if 0 a , then either 0 or  1. In both cases,  2 2 Bid v . 
 